Collaborative Data Acquisition by Zhang, Wen et al.
Crowdsourcing Data Acquisition via Social
Networks
Wen Zhang, Yao Zhang, and Dengji Zhao
School of Information Science and Technology,
ShanghaiTech University, Shanghai, China
{zhangwen,zhangyao1,zhaodj}@shanghaitech.edu.cn
Abstract. We consider a requester who acquires a set of data (e.g. im-
ages) that is not owned by one party. In order to collect all the data,
crowdsourcing mechanisms have been widely used to seek help from the
crowd. However, existing mechanisms rely on third-party platforms, and
the workers from these platforms are not necessarily helpful and redun-
dant data are also not properly handled. To combat this problem, we pro-
pose a novel crowdsourcing mechanism based on social networks, where
the rewards of the workers are calculated by information entropy and a
modified Shapley value. This mechanism incentivizes the workers from
the network to not only provide all data they have, but also further invite
their neighbours to offer more data. Eventually, the mechanism is able
to acquire all data from all workers on the network with a constrained
reward spending.
Keywords: Mechanism Design · Crowdsourcing · Data Acquisition ·
Social Network.
1 Introduction
Recent years witnessed the rise and development of deep learning [5]. Many
laboratories and companies put emphasis on building neural network applica-
tions such as DeepMind, Facebook AI Research (FAIR) and Stanford AI Lab
(SAIL). In these applications, large-scale datasets are indispensable. Therefore,
data acquisition underpins the success of these applications. Traditionally, they
may hire voluntaries to collect data such as photos or voices, which is a very
time-consuming and labour-intensive process.
Crowdsourcing is a teamwork collaboration mode in which companies use
the open call format to attract potential workers to finish the task at a lower
price, which was first proposed by Howe [4]. Many companies are committed to
crowdsourcing services such as Mechanical Turk and gengo AI. Consequently,
more and more research teams turn to these platforms to acquire data. For
example, ImageNet [2] from SAIL is retrieved by Mechanical Turk.
In traditional crowdsourcing models, the requester has to pay to not only
the data providers but also the third-party crowdsourcing platforms. However,
the data retrieved in this way may be tedious and repetitive, but the requester
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still has to pay for it. Therefore, whether the requester can benefit from the paid
crowdsourcing platforms is not clear. Moreover, the data retrieved in this way is
also revealed to the platform, which may cause a privacy issue.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a novel crowdsourcing mechanism for
data acquisition on social networks. The requester is the owner of the mechanism
and can use it to collect data without any third-party platforms. The mechanism
requires the requester to release the task information to her neighbours on the
network. Under this mechanism, the participants will be incentivized to provide
all their data and invite all their neighbours to do the task, because they will gain
payoffs not only from their offered data but also from their diffusion contribution.
By doing so, the task information can be disseminated through the whole social
network without giving any payments to the workers in advance.
Different from other crowdsourcing mechanisms, our mechanism only dis-
tributes rewards to those who provide effective data and do effective diffusion.
That is, the workers will not gain any payoff if they do not contribute to the
data acquisition task. Hence it can eliminate redundant and irrelevant data, and
avoid unnecessary expenses.
In the crowdsourcing literature, there are many related mechanisms pub-
lished. Franklin et al. focused on how to use crowdsourcing to process difficult
queries [3]. Chawla et al. proposed an optimal crowdsourcing contest for high-
quality submissions [1]. Zhou et al. studied a new method of measurement prin-
ciple for work quality [15]. Miller et al. devised a scoring system to evaluate the
feedback elicited [6]. Radanovicet al. presented a general mechanism to reward
the workers depending on peer consistency [9]. They are all different from our
work. They mainly focused on the crowdsourcing model to improve the quality
of the work provided by the workers and there is often a single ground truth
in their settings which is unknown to the requester. Our setting is not seeking
the answer for a ground truth, we are aiming for collecting rich data. Moreover,
their settings have not considered the task propagation via workers. In our set-
ting, we also incentivize the workers to propagate the task information to their
neighbours to collect more data.
There also exists some interesting literature about information diffusion on
social networks. Narayanam and Narahari studied the target set selection prob-
lem [7], which involves discovering a small subset of influential workers in a given
social network, to maximize the diffusion quality of the workers rather than in-
centivizing them to diffuse. In terms of incentivizing people to disseminate the
task information, a team from MIT has proposed an interesting solution under
the DARPA Network Challenge [8]. However, the solution only works for a tree
structure graph. Our mechanism refers to the idea and puts forward a modified
payoff policy for diffusion contribution in single-source directed acyclic graphs.
More importantly, the reward in the DARPA network challenge is predefined,
while in our setting it varies according to the data offered by the others.
Our mechanism is closely related to the strategy diffusion mechanism pro-
posed by Shen et al. [13]. However, their solution focuses on solving the problem
of false-name attacks and does not consider data effectiveness. Also, their mech-
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anism cannot guarantee that all the workers will propagate the task information
to all their neighbours.
The contributions of our mechanism advance the state of the art in the
following ways:
– We model a crowdsourcing mechanism on social networks without relying
on third-party platforms. Our mechanism incentivizes the workers to not
only offer their data truthfully but also propagate the task information to
their neighbours without paying them in advance. This guarantees that more
effective data is collected.
– We give a novel method to evaluate the effectiveness of the acquired data
and distribute rewards to the workers without unnecessary expenses. This is
achieved by Shapley value.
– Our mechanism is also budget constrained and the payoffs are adjustable by
the requester, which incentivizes the requesters to apply our mechanism in
real applications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
model of the problem setting. Section 3 gives a detailed description of the pro-
posed mechanism. Section 4 analyzes the key properties of the mechanism. Fi-
nally, we discuss future work in section 5.
2 The Model
Consider a data acquisition task T that is executed on a social network. To
simplify the representation, we first model the network as a directed acyclic
graph (DAG) G = (V,E) with a single source s ∈ V which is a special node
called the requester of task T , and later on we will consider a general graph. In
the graph, V = {s} ∪N where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of n workers and
E denotes the information flow between vertices. For any i 6= j ∈ V , if there
is a directed edge eij ∈ E from i to j, then i can directly propagate the task
information to j. Here, we say j is i’s child and i is j’s parent. Let rci be the
set of i’s children, rpi be the set of i’s parents and ri = (r
c
i , r
p
i ) be the neighbour
set of each i ∈ V . If there is a directed path from i to j, then we say j is i’s
successor and i is j’s predecessor. For each i ∈ V , let succ(i) be the set of i’s all
successors, and pred(i) be the set of i’s all predecessors. Each worker i ∈ V has
a depth li ≥ 0 representing the length of the shortest path from the requester
s to i. Figure 1 shows an example on the social network, where the number in
each node represents the worker’s ID.
In the above network, requester s wants to collect data of task T . Each worker
i ∈ N is a potential data owner and has a private dataset Di = {d1i , d2i , . . . , dki }
related to task T , where each dji ∈ Di represents an atomic data (e.g. an image)
and k is the number of atomic data owned by the worker i. Let D be the space
of all possible datasets. In our setting, we are not aiming for a single ground
truth, instead, we try to collect a dataset as rich as possible.
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Fig. 1. An example of a diffusion network
Given the problem setting, it is evident that the requester can only collect
data among her neighbours with whom she can directly communicate. Tradi-
tionally, to collect as much required data as possible, the requester tends to do
promotions with the help of some paid third-party advertising platforms (such
as Mechanical Turk and gengo AI). However, the quality of the data collected
can not be guaranteed and users may tend to give redundant data which is costly
but not useful for the requester.
In this paper, we propose a novel diffusion mechanism for crowdsourcing the
data. The goal of the mechanism is to incentivize the workers on the social net-
work to provide all the data they have and also propagate the task information to
all their neighbours. Different from other data collection platforms, the purpose
of our mechanism does not reward the redundant data providers (i.e., duplicate
data will not be paid). Furthermore, the workers’ total payoff is relevant not
only to their provided data but also to their diffusion contribution.
For each worker i ∈ N , let θi = (Di, rci ) be i’s type. Due to the information
flow constraint, we do not need to consider rpi in i’s strategy space. Then the
type profile of all the workers is denoted as θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) = (θi, θ−i), where
θ−i represents the type profile of all workers except i. Let Θi be i’s type space,
and Θ = (Θ1, . . . , Θn) = (Θi, Θ−i) is the type profile space for all the workers.
Our mechanism requires each worker i ∈ N participated in the mechanism
to report their type. Let θ′i = (D
′
i, r
c
i
′) be the type worker i reported, where D′i
is the data i provided and rci
′ is the children i has invited to do the task. Let
θ′i = nil if worker i is not invited or refuses to participate in the mechanism.
Definition 1. Given a report profile θ′ of all workers, let the network generated
be G(θ′) = (V ′, E′) ⊆ G, where V ′ = {s} ∪⋃i∈N rci ′ and E′ ⊆ E is reduced by
V ′.
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Definition 2. A report profile θ′ is feasible if for each worker i ∈ N with θ′i 6=
nil, there exists at least one path from requester s to i on the network G(θ′).
Intuitively, feasibility means that an agent cannot join in the mechanism if
she is not invited/informed about the sale, which holds naturally in practice.
Let F(θ) be the set of all feasible report profiles of θ. To simplify the descrip-
tion, the following discussion will only focus on feasible report profiles.
Definition 3. A crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism M on the social network
is defined by a payoff policy p = (pi)i∈N , where pi : Θ 7→ R.
Given a feasible report profile θ′ ∈ F(θ), pi(θ′) is the payoff of worker i for
her provided data and diffusion contribution.
To design a crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism, we hope that workers are
incentivized to give all their data and invite all their neighbours to offer more
data. This property is called incentive compatibility. An incentive compatible
(truthful) diffusion mechanism guarantees that for all workers i ∈ N , reporting
her true type is a dominant strategy, i.e., θ′i = (Di, r
c
i ).
Definition 4. A crowdsourcing diffusion mechanismM = p is incentive com-
patible (IC) if pi(θi, θ
′
−i) ≥ pi(θ′′i , θ′′−i), for all i ∈ N , θ′ ∈ F(θ), θ′′i ∈ Θi and
for any j 6= i, θ′′j = θ′j if there exists a path from s to j in G(θ′′i , θ′−i), otherwise
θ′′j = nil.
Under the crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism M = p, requester’s payment
Ps is the sum of the payments made to the workers. We say M is budget con-
strained if Ps is bounded by a constant C under all settings.
Definition 5. A crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism M = p is budget con-
strained (BC) if for all θ ∈ Θ and all θ′ ∈ F(θ), we have
Ps(θ′) =
∑
i∈N pi(θ
′) ≤ C
where C is a constant.
3 The Mechanism
In this section, we introduce our novel crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism (CDM).
The payoff policy of the mechanism is composed of two parts: data contribution
and diffusion contribution. The data contribution indicates how the requester s
validates workers’ provided data, and the diffusion contribution indicates how
the requester s validates other workers’ diffusion on the social network. Finally,
we will give the total payoff policy by using both.
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3.1 Data Contribution
The method we evaluate data contribution is based on Shapley value, which is
a classic method to allocate interest in cooperative games [11]. First we define
v : D 7→ R+ as the valuation function that evaluates the value of a dataset D for
the requester. Here the valuation function v should be monotone increasing and
bounded, i.e., for datasets Dx and Dy, if Dx ⊆ Dy, then v(Dx) ≤ v(Dy) < ∞.
Then if we directly apply the Shapley value among all workers on the network,
the data contribution for each worker i will be:
φi =
∑
S⊆N−{i}
|S|!(|N | − |S| − 1)!
|N |!
(
v(D′S∪{i})− v(D′S)
)
(1)
Here DS is the dataset offered by the workers in set S: DS =
⋃
i∈S Di. Intu-
itively, the Shapley value calculates the average marginal valuation contribution
of each worker. However, with this simple method, workers may not be willing
to share the task information to their neighbours as a worker’s neighbours with
similar data will compete with the worker to reduce her payoff, which against
what we want to achieve with the mechanism.
Proposition 1. A mechanism using Equation (1) as the evaluation of data con-
tribution is not incentive compatible.
Proof. Consider the network in Figure 3(a), if D1 = D2 = D and workers 1 and
2 truthfully offer their type, i,e., D′1 = D1 and D
′
2 = D2, then,
φ1 = φ2 =
v(D)
2
However, if the worker 1 choose to not propagate the task information to worker
2, then her data contribution becomes
φ′1 = v(D) > φ1
uunionsq
To combat the diffusion issue with Shapley value, we design the novel payoff
sharing mechanism called layered Shapley value. Let Li be the set of all the
workers with depth i: Li = {j|j ∈ N and lj = i}. Let L∗i be all the workers in
the first i layers, i.e., L∗i =
⋃i
k=1 Lk. Suppose there are totally K layers on the
network, K ≥ 1, then for each worker i, the layered Shapley value is defined as
follows:
φˆi =
∑
S⊆Lli−{i}
|S|!(|Lli | − |S| − 1)!
|Lli |!
·
(
v
(
D′L∗li−1∪S∪{i}
)
− v
(
D′L∗li−1∪S
))
(2)
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Intuitively speaking, Equation (2) calculates the average marginal contribu-
tion of the workers in the layer using the standard Shapley value, but assume
that all the workers in the prior layers have already joined the coalition before
them. More specifically, for the first layer (i.e., the requester’s neighbours), the
standard Shapley value is applied to calculate their data contribution among
the workers in the first layer only. Then for the workers in the second layer,
we also apply the Shapley value to compute their data contribution, under the
condition that all workers in the first layer are in the coalition first. The calcu-
lation after the second layer will not change the Shapley value of the first layer.
This continues for all the other layers. This ensures that workers close to the
requester will have a higher priority to get rewards for their data contributions.
More importantly, by using the layered Shapley value, we can still ensure the
following key properties:
(1) The sum of all workers’ layered Shapley value is equal to the valuation of
the whole dataset given by workers, i.e.
∑
i∈N φˆi = v(D
′
N ).
(2) If i and j are two workers in the same layer Ll who are equivalent in the
sense that v(D′L∗l−1∪S∪{i}) = v(D
′
L∗l−1∪S∪{j}) for all S ⊆ Ll s.t. i, j /∈ S, then
φˆi = φˆj .
(3) If there is a worker i who has v(D′L∗li−1∪S∪{i}
) = v(D′L∗li−1∪S
) for all S ⊆ Lli ,
which indicates that she does not provide any extra information, then φˆi = 0.
Therefore, we will not reward redundant data which has been provided by
others in the prior layers. The reason is that in this way child agents can not
decrease the utility of their parents and then all the workers are incentivized to
propagate the task information.
Till now, we have qualified the data contribution by the layered Shapley
value. There is one remaining problem when we apply it to a real-world appli-
cation, which is how to choose the valuation function v. Here we will give a
possible approach using information entropy. Information entropy is a function
which was first proposed by Shannon [10]. Now it becomes a traditional method
to measure the amount of the information of data [14,12]. Information entropy
is defined in terms of distributions q on some space X with finite dimension |X|:
H(q) = −E[log q]
To evaluate a dataset D related to the data acquisition task T by informa-
tion entropy, we can assume the overall dataset required by the requester s can
be classified in m independent target classes, denoted by X = {X 1, . . . ,Xm}.
For each class X j ∈ X , let Xj be its feature space with a predefined finite
dimension |Xj |. Then for a dataset D, every atomic data d ∈ D can be ex-
pressed as a feature vector d = (x1d, . . . , x
m
d ), where x
j
d ∈ Xj is the specific
feature in class X j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m. For example, if the task is to collect im-
ages of nature, let the two target classes be animals and plants. The space of
animals is defined as {dog, cat, others} and the space of plants is defined as
{tree, flower, grass, tree and flower, others}. Suppose a dataset D has two
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images d1 and d2, where d1 is an image with a dog beside a tree while d2 is an
image with a cat lying on the lawn. Then d1 = (dog, tree) and d2 = (cat, grass).
We also need to define a distribution function Q : D 7→ q, where q =
(q1, . . . ,qm) is the distribution vector of the dataset D. Each qj represents
the distribution over the feature space Xj of the dataset D. In the exam-
ple above, the distribution of the class animals is q1 = (0.5, 0.5, 0) and the
distribution of the class plants is q2 = (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0). Therefore, Q(D) =
((0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0, 0)).
Now we can use information entropy to evaluate a dataset D using the joint
entropy defined on m independent target classes:
v(D) , H(Q(D)) = H(q1, . . . ,qm) =
m∑
i=1
H(qi) (3)
Lemma 1. Given a dataset D related to task T , the valuation of the dataset D
by Equation (3) is bounded.
Proof. According to the definition of information entropy, we can calculate the
valuation of D as:
v(D) = H(Q(D)) = H(q1, . . . ,qm)
=
m∑
i=1
H(qi) ≤
m∑
i=1
log |Xi|
Since the dimensions of feature spaces of the task T are predefined and finite,
the valuation v(D) is bounded by a constant. uunionsq
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Fig. 2. (a) shows layers in a diffusion network and (b) is an example of diffusion
contribution
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Take the network in Figure 2(a) as an example. Worker 1, 2 and 3 are in
layer 1; worker 4, 5 and 6 are in layer 2; worker 7 and 8 are in layer 3; worker 9 is
in layer 4. The layer-related Shapley value of the worker 1 is: φˆ1 =
1
6 · (v(D′1) +
v(D′1) + (v(D
′
{1,2})− v(D′2)) + (v(D′{1,3})− v(D′3)) + (v(D′{1,2,3})− v(D′{2,3})) +
(v(D′{1,2,3})−v(D′{2,3}))) = 16 ·(2v(D′1)−v(D′2)−v(D′3)+v(D′{1,2})+v(D′{1,3})−
2v(D′{2,3}) + 2v(D
′
{1,2,3})). This is consistent with intuition that what effective
data should be.
S 21
(a)
S 32 4
1
(b)
S 2 4
1
3
(c)
S 3 4
1
2
(d)
Fig. 3. Basic cases in crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism
3.2 Diffusion Contribution
In traditional crowdsourcing mechanisms, only those who are aware of the task
information can compete for some rewards. So the participants who have been
informed have no reason to invite their neighbours to do the task. Therefore, to
incentivize workers to propagate the information, CDM will give them payoffs
for their diffusion contribution. In other words, the workers will gain benefits by
spreading the task information to their neighbours.
In our mechanism, the diffusion contribution of a worker i for her successor
j is recursively computed as:
pii,j =

∑
k∈rpi ′ pik,j · γ ·
1
mjk
if i ∈ pred(j)\s
α · φˆj if i = s
0 otherwise
(4)
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where 0 < γ ≤ 12 and 0 < α ≤ 1.
Here, the parameters are interpreted as: mjk is the number of worker k’s child
neighbours which has a path to j. For example, in Figure 2(b), among all the
child neighbours of the requester, only worker 2 and worker 3 have a path to
worker 7. Hence, m7s = 2. Similarly, m
7
2 = m
7
3 = 1. Factor γ is a discount factor
and α is the proportion factor, which are predefined coefficients. Note that pis,j
is a virtual payoff of the requester to simplify the calculation.
To show the intuition behind our mechanism, we study three basic cases and
only consider the diffusion contribution of worker 3 for her successor worker 4
in Figure 3(a), 3(b) and 3(d).
Firstly, we have pis,4 = α · φˆ4 for all three cases. In Figure 3(b), since the
network is a chain, the contribution of a worker is her parent’s contribution
multiplied by a discount factor γ, then we have pi2,4 = γ · pis,4 = γ · α · φˆ4 and
pi3,4 = γ · pi2,4 = γ2 · α · φˆ4. In Figure 3(c), since the requester has two children
who are connected to worker 4, the worker 1 and 2 have to share the discounted
contribution from their parent, then we have pi1,4 = pi3,4 =
1
2 ·γ ·pis,4 = 12γ ·α · φˆ4.
In Figure 3(d), since the diffusion path from 1 to 4 and from 2 to 4 both contains
worker 3, worker 3’s contribution are the sum of the discounted contribution from
her parents. Then we have pi3,4 = γ · pi1,4 + γ · pi2,4 = γ ·α · φˆ4. Therefore, all the
workers’ contribution can be computed by Equation (3).
Finally, the total diffusion contribution of worker i is defined as:
pii =
∑
j∈N
pii,j
The intuition behind the diffusion contribution of CDM is that if a worker’s
successor provides some effective data, then the worker will be rewarded for
her diffusion. Furthermore, from Equation (3), we can easily conclude that the
diffusion contribution is evaluated along the path layer by layer.
The requester can adjust the two factors α and γ for different demands. A
higher α implies that the requester is willing to give more rewards for diffusion
contribution, which will also bring greater expenses. A higher γ means that the
diffusion contribution will decrease rapidly with depth.
Lemma 2. Given a data contribution φˆj related to task T from worker j, the
diffusion contribution distributed to all her predecessors is bounded.
Proof. According to the definition of diffusion contribution in Equation (4), we
can calculate the total contribution of j’s predecessors as:∑
i∈N
pii,j ≤
∞∑
k=1
γk · α · φˆj
≤ γ
1− γ · α · φˆj
Since φˆj is bounded according to the Equation (2), the total contribution of j’s
predecessors is bounded by a constant. uunionsq
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Take the network in Figure 2(b) as an example. Let α = 1 and γ = 12 . If
worker 7 has an data contribution φˆ7, then we can calculate all the corresponding
diffusion contribution: pis,7 = φˆ7; pi2,7 = pis,7× 12 × 12 = φˆ74 ; pi3,7 = pis,7× 12 × 12 =
φˆ7
4 ; pi5,7 = pi2,7 × 12 × 1 + pi3,7 × 12 × 1 = φˆ74 .
3.3 Total Payoff
At last, we can get our total payoff policy:
pi = λφˆi + µpii
where λ ≥ α · µ > 0 are predefined factors. This is to ensure that the payoff
for data contribution is greater than that for diffusion contribution. Otherwise,
the workers may not want to offer their data. Another important observation
is pi ≥ 0 and bounded since φˆi ≥ 0 and bounded. The detailed proof will be
illustrated in the next section.
The total procedure of the mechanism is shown below.
Crowdsourcing Diffusion Mechanism (CDM)
Input :
A feasible θ′ ∈ F(θ) and parameters λ, µ, α and γ s.t. λ ≥ α · µ > 0.
1. Construct the generated social network graph G(θ′).
2. Run breadth first search on the graph G(θ′) and get the layer sets L1,
L2, . . . , LK .
3. Set A = ∅.
4. For i in 1 . . .K, consider workers in Li:
(a) Compute the layered Shapley value φˆj for each worker j in Li by
Equation (2).
(b) Set A = A ∪ Li.
5. Initialize pii,j = 0 for all i, j ∈ N .
6. For each worker i ∈ N , start from the requester s, set B = {s}, pis,i =
αφˆi. Until B = {i}, do:
(a) For each worker j ∈ B, consider each k ∈ rcj ′ ∩ pred(i), update the
diffusion contribution pik,i ← pik,i + γ · pij,i/m, where m = |rcj ′ ∩
pred(i)|.
(b) Set B =
⋃
rcj
′ ∩ pred(i).
7. For each worker i, calculate pii =
∑
j∈N pii,j .
Output :
Return total payoff λφˆi + µpii for each worker i.
In general, CDM is a centralized data acquisition mechanism. In the begin-
ning, the requester does not know all the workers except her neighbors, so she
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can only inform her neighbors about the task. Under CDM, the workers informed
are incentivized to invite their neighbors to join in the task and to provide all
the data they owned to the requester directly. In this way, the requester can
collect data as rich as possible without any third-party platforms.
4 Properties of CDM
In this section, we will prove that our crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism is
incentive compatible and budget constrained. The mechanism also helps the
requester collect more effective data. With these properties, a requester is incen-
tivized to apply our mechanism.
Theorem 1. The data collected from the crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism is
no less than only doing the crowdsourcing among the requester’s neighbours.
Proof. Traditionally, the participants in crowdsourcing mechanism are those
whom the requester can directly communicate with (i.e., the requester is a plat-
form and participants are the registered users of the platform). These users can
be viewed as the requester’s child neighbours in CDM, denoted as rcs ∈ N ,
which is a subset of all the workers on the social network. Then we have:
DCDMN =
⋃
i∈N Di ⊃
⋃
rcs
Di. Therefore, the amount of data collected in CDM
is always equal to or greater than that of traditional crowdsourcing mechanisms.
uunionsq
Theorem 2. The crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. For each worker i, her private dataDi is composed of three parts (D
f
i , D
i
i, D
b
i ),
where Dfi , D
i
i and D
b
i respectively means the data has been offered by the work-
ers in the previous layers, the data can be only offered by the workers in the
same layer as i and the data can be offered by the workers in the succedent
layers. Obviously, we can discuss the three parts separately.
1. For Dfi , the worker i will receive zero payoffs in our mechanism. She cannot
enlarge this payoff by reporting a Dfi
′ ⊆ Dfi or by inviting fewer workers
since it has nothing to do with the workers in previous layers.
2. For Dii, suppose in the layer where i is, there are k workers (including i) own
this data where 1 ≤ k ≤ |Lli |. Then according to the property of Shapley
value, if i truthfully offers Dii, these k workers will share the payoffs for this
data. Therefore, the payoff the worker i will receive is λv(Dii)/k. If she offers
a Dii
′ ⊆ Dii, then the payoff will become to λv(Dii ′)/k ≤ λv(Dii)/k. If she
invites fewer workers, it has nothing to do with her payoffs.
3. For Dbi , suppose worker i is the predecessor of the first worker j in the
succedent layers who also owns this data; otherwise, she will not be rewarded
if not offering this data or inviting fewer neighbours. If she reports Dbi
′ ⊂ Dbi ,
she transfers some of her data payoffs to diffusion payoffs. Then the payoff
for her diffusion contribution is µpii,j < µ · α · φˆj ≤ λφˆj = λv(Dbi − Dbi ′),
where λv(Dbi−Dbi ′) is the payoff if i offers this part of data by herself. Hence,
she will be likely to offer the whole Dbi by herself.
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Therefore, for each worker i, truthfully reporting her type is the dominant strat-
egy, i.e., θ′i = θi = (Di, r
c
i ). uunionsq
Theorem 3. The crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism is budget constrained.
Proof. The total dataset retrieved by our crowdsourcing diffusion mechanism is
DN =
⋃
i∈N Di. In Lemma 3.2, we have that
∑
i∈N pii,j is bounded. Since the
requester’s expenses Ps is the sum of the payoffs, then we have:
Ps =
∑
i∈N
pi =
∑
i∈N
(λφˆi + µpii)
=
∑
i∈N
λφˆi +
∑
i∈N
µpii
=
∑
i∈N
λφˆi +
∑
j∈N
µ
∑
i∈N
pii,j
≤
∑
i∈N
λφˆi +
∑
j∈N
µ · γ
1− γ · α · φˆj
=
(
λ+ µ · α · γ
1− γ
)∑
i∈N
φˆi
≤
(
λ+ λ · γ
1− γ
)∑
i∈N
φˆi
≤ λ
1− γ
∑
i∈N
φˆi
≤ 2λv(DN )
Then, we can conclude that the expenses for a data acquisition task T will
not exceed 2λv(DN ), which is bounded. Moreover, the requester can control the
budget by adjusting the factors. uunionsq
At last, we show that our mechanism can work on any social networks rather
than DAGs. Since CDM is executed layer by layer, we can first run breadth first
traversal on the network and then reduce the edges between the workers in the
same layer. After reduction, an arbitrary network can be transferred to a DAG
with all the properties remained.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a novel crowdsourcing mechanism via social
networks. The mechanism is running by the task requester, and she does not need
to pay in advance for getting the promotions. The prominent contribution of our
mechanism is that it incentivizes participants to propagate the task information
to their neighbours and to involve more workers in the task. Besides that, all
workers will also offer as much data as they have. One of the keys to guarantee
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these properties is that workers who are close to the requester will have a higher
priority to win rewards than their children according to layered Shapley value.
Since our mechanism is based on social networks, it is very challenging to
conduct experiments on existing crowdsourcing platforms such as Mechanical
Turk. It will be a valuable future work for us to carefully design the experiments
based on either existing crowdsourcing platforms or social networks.
Our work has several interesting aspects for future investigation. First of all,
the false-name attack is typical in a crowdsourcing system. Hence, designing an
advanced mechanism which is false-name proof is a vital successor work. Besides,
we can also consider the cost for workers to offer the data and make diffusion
in future work. Another scene can be considered where workers’ action will be
affected by their neighbours. The last valuable further work can be generalising
our mechanism to other crowdsourcing tasks rather than data acquisition.
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